Original notes pt2- how do the gods work

This next part was written solely by Antiquor who barely remembers writing it

Concerning gods

(Yes, this is actually how it works, otherwise it wouldn't make sense logically or rationally, if you have any questions, ask, I’d rather I answer more questions than mistakes we need to correct later. Thank you)

The concept of a god is a struggle without prior knowledge. Thankfully, I know what this all works, so I’m going to lay it all out for you. All you need to do is follow the guidelines and everything falls into place. This section here is extremely important no matter what our starting lore is, you do not want to be in a situation where someone asks you a question that they should know the answer to, and you don’t, especially if it's in relation to the gods.

Definitions:

By that which is self-caused, I mean, that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only as existing.
A thing is said to be finite in its own kind [in suo genre finita] when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is said to be finite because we can always conceive another body greater than it. So, too, a thought is limited by another thought. But the body is not limited by thought, and thought is not limited by body.
By substance, I mean, that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed.
By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives the substance as constituting its essence.
By mode, I mean the affections (qualities) of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else.
In order to answer the question related. I didn’t really use mode too much in retrospect, so you can really just ignore that this is here, it's just something else that I decided later on I didn’t really need to cover in order to give the basic view.
By God, I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, a substance containing infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.
That thing is said to be free [liber] which exists solely from the necessity of its own nature, and is determined to action by itself alone. A thing is said to be necessary [necessarius] or rather, constrained [coactus], if it is determined by another thing to exist and to act in a definite and determinate way.
By eternity, I mean existence itself insofar as it is conceived as necessarily following solely from the definition of an eternal thing.
For such existence is conceived as an eternal truth, just as is the essence of the thing, and therefore cannot be explicated through duration nor time, even if duration be conceived as without beginning or end.

Axioms:

All things that are, either in themselves or something else.
Referring to all things, physical or not. Ax. 3 helps to better understand this. All thing need to have a cause if they are an effect, but this axiom is here to help understand that the effect might just be the cause e.g. A god exist because they are self-created/self-existent (use self-existent), so a god exists because they have the attribute of Aseity, i.e. being from itself.
That which cannot be conceived through another thing must be conceived through itself.
From a given determinate cause there necessarily follows and effect; on the other hand, if there be no determinate cause, it is impossible that an effect should follow
The knowledge of an effect depends on , and involves, the knowledge of the cause.
Things which have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood through each other; that is, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other.
A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea [ideatum].
If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence

Proposition and Proof (Only the first 8)

Substance is by nature prior to its affections
This is evident from Defs. 3 and 5.
Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common.
This too is evident from Def. 3; for each substance must be in itself and be conceived through itself; that is, the conception of the one does not involve the other.
When things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other.
If things have nothing in common, then (Ax. 5) they cannot be understood through one another, one cannot be the cause of the other
Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of the affection of substances
All things that are, are either in themselves or in something else (Ax. 1); that is (Defs. 3 and 5), nothing exists external to the intellect except the substances and their affections. Therefore, there can be nothing external to the intellect through which several things can be distinguished from one another except substances or (which is the same thing) (Def. 4) the attributes and affections of substances.
In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute
If there were several such distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference of attributes or by a difference of affections (Pr. 4). If they are distinguished only by a difference of attributes, then it will be granted that there cannot be more than one substance of the same attribute. But if they are distinguished by a difference of affection, then, since substance is by nature prior to its affections (Pr. 1), disregarding therefore its affections and considering substance in itself, that is (Def. 3 and Ax. 6) considering it truly, it cannot be conceived as distinguishable from another substance. That is (Pr. 4), there cannot be several substances but only one.
One substance cannot be produced by another substance
In the same universe there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (Pr. 5), that is (Pr. 2), two substances having something in common. And so (Pr. 3) one cannot be the cause of the other; that is, one cannot be produced by the other.
(Corollary) Hence it follows that substance cannot be produced by anything else. For in the universe there exist nothing but substances and affections, as is evident from Ax. 1 and Defs. 3 and 5. But, by Pr. 6, it cannot be produced by another substance. Therefore, substance cannot be produced by anything else whatsoever.
This can be proved even more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For if substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of substance would have to depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. 4) and so (Def. 3) it would not be substance.
Existence belongs to the nature of substance
Substance cannot be produced by anything else (Cor. Pr. 6) and is therefore self-caused [causa sui]; that is (Def. 1), its essence necessarily involves existence; that is, existence belongs to its nature.
Every substance is necessarily infinite
There cannot be more than one substance having the same attribute (Pr. 5), and existence belongs to the nature of the substance (Pr. 7). It must therefore exist either as finite or as infinite. But it cannot exist as finite, for (Def. 2) it would have to be limited by another substance of the same nature, and that substance would also have to exist (Pr. 7). And so there would exist two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (Pr. 5). Therefore, it exists as infinite.
The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it has
This is evident from Definition 4

Basic rules on how a god works

A god is eternal, this is, all the attributes of such god is eternal
A god’s existence and their essence are one and the same
All things that follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of a god must have existed always, and as infinite; that is, through the said attribute they are eternal and infinite
The essence of things produced by a god does not involve existence.
A god’s power is their very essence
Whatever we conceive to be within a god’s power necessarily exists
Nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow
No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.